Catherine argues that nonhuman animals are viewed as things, less than human being. If the father of all the social structures on hierarchies, or mother of all communal characteristics, is the animate-inanimate separation, it is rapidly followed by the human-animal dichotomy, and thereafter the modern society of male-female line. The writer style in the comparison of humans’ treatment of animals with males’ treatment of women clearly illustrates how the legal structures reaction to animals is gendered ,stressing its reaction to women inequity to men as well. Catharine in his book, points out that animals in the society are abused like animals, females like animals ,and are equated to things ,are cross-examined in search of equal light (Kelly 362).
Catherine observes that people in the community govern animals, and men govern women. This is linked to the elements of hierarchy and disparity with specifications and variations within and amid them. One relationship between the two hierarchies is ideological factor.
According to Catherine, despite the clear proof than male socially govern females and human being dictate other animals, the fact of this clear relation of subordination and power exist amid the two is broadly denied. In her work, the author says that both animals and women as viewed as requiring to be subdued and tamed. Women and animals are taken to be seriously powerful so must reduced to powerless ,if not locked up in a given environment and killed when they try to come out. On the rights of the animals very little or no attention has been directed towards their abuse. Animal scholars have given little attention to sexual mistreatment and use of animals. Predicating animal rights on the capacity to experience less probable to fall the same category of suffering than legal frameworks to women rights have not been well articulated. The law on sexual abuse has not been well delivered to protect women against sexual abuses. Catharine further observes that women has been animalized, animals feminized at the same breadth (Kelly 363).
In the work by Elizabeth Anderson’s “Animal rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life”, has her argument based on central argument from insignificant instances and claims that nonhuman has their rights too. She reasons that the argument based on marginal cases and it is “obtuse”. Elizabeth uncertainty regarding the marginal case argument in broad does not originate from a loyalty to the claim that animals are significant in a strictly influential manner. She plainly admits that animals’ importance lies on the ‘inherent value’. This argument of animals possessing inherent value does not guarantee her to protect an animal welfare stand like that of Peter Singer’s stance .Furthermore, her stand cannot allow her to shield the stronger animal rightist position .She goes further and rejects animal rights and animal welfare as advocated by Singer and Regan, because she does not belief on argument based on marginal cases, which, once more, she observes it as a principal argument beyond these standpoints. Anderson has a perception that the application of the argument based on marginal cases depends on its striking plainness, in which ethics of justice are immediately developed from the ownership of valuable abilities, for example, sentience .This brings sufficient requirement for ethical consideration. According to Anderson, the challenge with the argument using marginal cases is that it denies the ideology that species membership can be ethically subjective in the sense that the rich complication of animals and human beings is more often bonded with societal links with other members of the same species. This means that, the ethics of justice ought not to be developed from singularly on the ground of the inherent abilities of moral patients.
Nevertheless, animals’ rights activists admit that the species of animals belongs can take a different form based on its abilities: pigs apparently are capable of experiencing pain, but it raises questions if clams can experience the same feeling because they lack central nervous system .The clams only possess group of ganglia to allow them to respond to various stimuli in elementary manner. Animal rightists were subjected positively by the argument based on marginal cases nonetheless thought that people should earn their societal entitlements based on their merits to apply Anderson language. Apparently what Anderson means here is that the protector of the argument would not involuntarily see a specific pig in question was attentive and logical as the person. In the same way concerning an individual clam and individual pig, were a unique clam or a non- attentive pig to be found. Anderson has a different opinion. She has the opinion that no fine-tuning of the argument based on marginal case will make it effective sufficiently to deal with aspects like development of language skills. Any person who discovers language has the ultimate right to be reinforced to learn more skills of the language; while chimpanzees can study language they have no such right. According to Anderson, believes that there no reason to deny chimpanzee to learn new language since the features of the species life of chimpanzees do not need linguistic communication ,while the features of human being require linguistic communication. Chimpanzees can exist with the skills in communication in order to prosper, but human being need communication for its development.
Some rapprochement with Elizabeth Anderson can be attained when she claims that with respect to protection from reckless brutality’ the inherent capability to be responsive is adequate to warrant safeguarding from in spite of which species association the animal in question belongs. Anderson is pleased with the manner that extra protections that touch tamed animals, and not the untamed, is determined by proximity and protection by human beings. These social provisions are determined by historical subjects’ facts concerning the specific requirement of the urban community as opposed to hunters and gatherers. Anderson in his opinion protects the rights of animals, but she still has perception that argument anchored on marginal cases is an easy way of providing protection to animals. She says that there no any criterion applied in order to determine the degree of morality, in addition to inherent capabilities, an animal’s genus nature and its societal associations with moral means .Diverse social environments produce varied animal rights (Kelly 364).
Anderson, who was the chief critic of the argument anchored on marginal cases attaches more significance on essentially accessible moral societies and their capabilities to formulate moral boundaries. He says that ultimate ethical societies as discovered by rational investigation, are ignored. This harbors a danger since it results to reification of certain ancient prejudices. Anderson puts that as long as the nominal rights that the method of argument based on marginal cases gives to marginal cases of civilization and animals are recognized, it is allowable to enact more protection policies concerning marginal cases of mankind. Anderson concludes that, the argument on marginal cases provides reasons for safeguarding on the assertion that animals have fundamental rights because of their sentiency and the species relationship is inappropriate when selecting moral patient type itself (Kelly 365).
Kelly, Oliver. Animal lessons: How they teach us to be human. Chicago, CA: Columbia
University Press, 2009. Print.