Introduction
My essay will argue that the national parliaments have been the “losers’ of European Integration in that it has lost most power that it had before the European integration. Additionally, the essay will provide evidence based on the changes in the legislature in the bid to regain the powers. Depending on an individual’s school of thought, one can argue either that the national parliaments of the countries that make up the European integration have been losers or have benefitted. Many scholars have discussed that the process of European integration has led to the transfer of legislative power from the national level to the European level. This means that the elected individuals from the national governments who are supposed to make decisions of the national governments have had their responsibility transferred to the European level (De Vries and Hobolt, 2012).
The national parliaments have become losers in the European integration. While the competencies of the European integration in terms of the European Union have been broadened lately, the prerogatives of the national parliaments have been immensely reduced in terms of the powers that the European institutions have. Initially, the creation of the European Union was as a result of the establishment of new institutional decision-making processes and structures. From the start, the powers that the European parliament had exceeded the main functionality of the parliamentarism in the national level. When properly analyzed, the creation of the European integration resulted in the surrendering of the legislative competence of the national governments. Lately, this has been visible in that the European Union and the Member states tried to solve the Euro Crisis when they set up EU facilities and intergovernmental facilities such as the European Stability Mechanism and the European financial Stability Facility.
It is the main responsibility of the national parliaments to hold accountable the governments and to guarantee that there is a meaningful scrutiny of the government while having a significant control over the executive branch of the government. When the leaders of the national governments represent the citizens on the European level, there is an increased difficulty in scrutinizing the policies that occur at the European level. According to Kourvetaris and Moschonas (1996, p. 234), the impacts of the deepening integration are not positive for the national governments. The erosion of the parliamentary control over the executive branches is viewed as the departmentalization. The instances whereby the national governments can be viewed as losers in the European integration process can be coined in terms of three components; reduced national policy autonomy, information asymmetries and the shift in the domestic executive-legislative balance.
The allocation of competencies and policy-making to European establishments abridged the legislative responsibility of national parliaments, which is frequently restricted to the inversion of European legislation. National parliaments in precise, experienced a double marginalisation: their national powers were abridged as a consequence of policy transferences to the EU; and it is predominantly problematic to subsidize to the policy level where the shifted prerogatives are held. National administrators also experienced a decrease of their rule autonomy as a result of the combination and the effects of supervisory competition, but as fundamental actors at the European negotiating table, they have safeguarded a continued and fundamental part in (European) policy-making
The national executive-legislative equilibrium has also been predisposed by European integration. There is the above-stated structural shortcoming whereby national parliaments have no representation in the EU, and domestic executives have undeviating access to European decision-making. The technocratic makings of European strategy making further reinforces the executive branch and its administrators vis-à-vis the national assemblies. Furthermore, the purpose of national positions on European matters requires widespread organizational coordination across strategy levels (for instance, in federal systems) and interventions and departments. National parliaments are frequently poorly prepared to screen and partake in these vital domestic synchronization efforts. The executive preponderance in European affairs fuels vital information disproportions that put national parliaments at an extra disadvantage. National parliaments do not have the same direct admission to data and processing capacity as federal administrators in relation to European matters.
According to Kochenov (2008, p. 45) the facts deficit can additionally enable the executive division to operate short of much parliamentary oversight. The ‘deparliamentalisation’ concept paints a bleak depiction of the many encounters that the European influential architecture arrays for national parliaments. The concept of deparmentalisation means that the national governments are viewed as small sections of the European integration. The vitality of the national parliaments is reduced, and some opinions of some national parliaments may be ignored. First, for some countries, the governments have to apply to join the European union. Once the process is complete, the national parliaments have to ensure that they do not lose sight of their initial responsibility of representing the people. The admission into the European Union for some countries sees the shift in the manner in which the countries view their citizens. Nevertheless, national parliaments have not inertly resigned to a part of idle bystanders. National parliaments have progressively fought back and have tried to reaffirm their scrutiny and oversight competences in relation to European matters.
The occurrence of authorizing powers is often viewed as an indication of important parliamentary power. These argument necessities to be qualified for two causes. Firstly, the augmented use of qualified majority elective in the Council confines national and parliamentary control over European consultations and policy results, even if mandatory parliamentary decrees have been allotted. Next, parliamentary majorities are questionable to cause disagreement by discarding projected government intercession mandates, particularly when these divergent opinions may be subjugated by opposition individuals according to Bilancia (2012, p. 34).
A third group of so-called Easy-going influences, for instance, Spain or Greece, can be recognized. These national parliaments concentrate on informal negotiation with the government and try to find an influence over broad parliamentary deliberations on European matters. The “Influencers” do not organize a methodical scrutiny of EU official papers or of the government’s place in the Council (Steunenberg and Thomassen, 2002, p. 61).
Kiiver (2006, p. 56) argues that parliaments focused on document inspection have started to organize inquiries with ministers in order to screen the government’s position more closely. Many national parliaments with authorizing systems have answered to the Barroso ingenuity of 2006, reinforced the document scrutiny, and involved in the design of opinions unswervingly to the Commission. The scrutiny of the documents ensures that the national parliaments have some responsibility towards the citizens of their various countries. This also means that the document inspection has to be passed in the individual national parliaments before it is approved by the European Parliament.
Virtually all national parliaments, whether functioning with document-based or authorizing systems, still supposed their national government to be the foremost object of inquiry and influence in 2007. According to Corbett (2001, p. 98), parliamentary exertions still mostly focus on the domestic level, and few parliaments keenly seek to power the European institutions unswervingly. In this concern, the Barroso initiative of 2006 to convey Commission documents unswervingly to national parliaments with an uncluttered invitation to remark on the documents may be the bearer of news on a re-orientation of national parliamentary ingenuities from the national on the way to the European level and the European Commission in precise. It can also be said that the institutional changes that happened after the creation of the European integration ensured that the impacts that the national parliaments have is reduced. Charles (n.d) notes that there is a necessity to increase the significance of the national parliaments in the system through the early warning mechanism. This early warning mechanism allows the national parliaments of the member states to submit an opinion that is reasoned in that it has to give the reasons as to why it does not consider the new changes in the system complies with the principle of the subsidiarity. The national parliaments are given two votes. There is though a tricky in that the national parliaments normally find it difficult to differentiate between the subsidiary issues from the proportionality issues. It is imperative to comprehend that even though the national governments have found it difficult to the interpretation of the common subsidiary due to the vague nature of the orange and the yellow cards. The power that the national parliaments will have is not entirely new but that powers that they had, they could not object to the changes in the national legislation. The national parliaments have become less significant in that the members of parliament cannot be constructive actors in the new system in that they cannot place new agendas on the parliaments or change the policies of the European integration. Additionally, the national parliaments have become losers in that the discussions that are made in the European parliaments cover the whole of the member countries. The issues that affect the specific countries are not discussed as they are viewed as the sole responsibility of the national government. According to Ellison (2008), the continuous change in the different electoral systems of the member countries that constitute the European integration means that there is an overlap between the different member country representatives and what may have been proposed by one parliament may be opposed by the next parliament thereby leading to a standoff in the long run. The relationship between the voters of the national parliaments and the representatives of the national parliaments in the European Union means that it is the view of the ruling party in the parliament that will be considered. In most of the democratic countries, the individuals representing the national governments may not always represent the views of the entire national parliament. However, there is a snowballing body of evidence that this is slowly changing. In the past, of the European integration, the setting that was encouraged was that of a permissive consensus. The individual parliamentary leaders could just continue with their policies with little regard to the public opinions. Currently, there is an increased mobilization based on the increasing conflict between the political parties based on the integration. The different literature provided above does not only depict that the national governments have been losers, but also the strategies that they have implemented in order to be relevant once again. As a problem of fact, it is not only the national parliaments that have been negatively influenced by the European integration. The traditional governments have also been influenced. The national governments in the European parliaments also feel the opposition that the national parliaments normally feel. There is however some evidence that depicts that the national parliaments and the traditional governments are working together to smoothen the process of European integration (Gillespie, 2009).
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is imperious to note that the national parliaments have been ‘losers in the process of European Integration. This is because the numbers of reasons that have been provided above outweigh the reactions that the national governments have provided. The tide is however changing due to the various developments such as the Barossa initiative of 2006 in that it gives the national governments, more powers in terms of regulating the powers of the European Union. The other treaties such as the Lisbon treaty are also vital in guaranteeing the reintroduction of the roles of the government. Currently, the national parliaments of the domestic government should improve on the document inspections and organize more commissions and inquiries so as to have the European legislators responsible. The said system focuses on analyzing current and past development experiences in parliamentary scrutiny concerning matters of European Union hence condoning the union. In brief, it can be mentioned that the national parliaments have had their significantly reduced by the increased autonomy in the national government's negotiation powers, the empowerment of the European parliament and the other kinds of policy negotiations that the national parliaments used to have.
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