Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
Reynolds vs. United States
A villain sex offender should grant the state with, and revise information such as names and current address, for purposes of state and federal sex offender registries under the Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act. Failure by the sex offender to abide by the requirements of Act whenever he travels intestate is a crime. The Act further requires the sex offender to provide offenders convict prior to effective date and gives the attorney power to stipulate the applicability registration requirements to pre-Act criminal. The Act was passed to a law in July 2006 and centers on homogeneous and effectual patchwork of pre-Act federal and state registration classification. The attorney publicized a temporal rule demanding that the Act should be implemented to all pre-Act offenders. This Supreme Court’s decision involves Reynolds, petitioner versus the State. This paper discusses Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act and how the decision was reached and the circumstance that fueled this process.
Reynolds relocated to Pennsylvania from Missouri where he had registered but failed to update his data with both Missouri and Pennsylvania registration systems. Consequently, he was charged for failure to conform to the Act’s requirements between September 16th and October 16th, 2007. He ignored the charges claiming that the Act was not applicable to pre-Act criminals at that time. He disputed the claims saying that the temporal rule infringed the constitution’s doctrine and administrative measures Act’s notice. However, Reynolds’s claims were discarded by the court devoid of reaching the intrinsic worth, finalizing that Act’s prerequisites were appropriate, even in the nonexistence of attorney’s interim rule, to pre-Act offenders. As a result, the court proved that no legal difference existed despite the validity of the interim rule.
The act does not require compulsory registration before the attorney but genuinely stipulates the requirement apply to all sex offenders. This decision was held up by the Act’s content that comprises of four declarations. The first declaration states that the offender must register and update the registration. The second declaration points out that the criminal should register prior to completion of incarceration period. The third one requires the sex offender to should revise registration information during the first three days of business upon change of name, employment, and residence or student status. The last declaration empowers the attorney general to spell out the areas of application of the Act’s requirement to sex criminal convicted ahead of endorsement of the Act. The forth declaration decides on the congress’s fear for realistic problems facing the application of new registration rules to the massive number of pre-Act offenders. The application of new registration to new pre-Act criminals could have been costly and impossible to do immediately.
The government had three divergent arguments. The first argument was that the court’s decision clashes with aim of the Act, which was to ascertain a registration system that consists of pre-Act offenders. The second contradiction expressed by the government was that the decision could result to an oddly long accomplishment delay. Thirdly, the immediate applications Act to all pre-Act offenders are unpersuasive. It has been noted that some lower courts apply the Act to only pre-Act offenders who cannot conform to the acts requirement of initial registration. The selective application of the Act contradicts to what it states. The question whether the attorney general’s temporal rule is a legitimate stipulation raises concern because the Acts registration conditions do not have an effect on pre-Act offenders until he specifies.
In conclusion, the federal sex offender registration and notification Act demands that sex offenders should provide to the government and update their information for state and federal sex criminal registries. The circumstance that led to this decision was brought by the relocation of Reynolds who failed to conform to the Act when he relocated, claiming that the Act is not applicable to him. However, these claims were refuted by the court basing on the attorney’s interim law hence it was agreed that the law is applicable to all sex offenders. The government offered a challenge by posing contrary arguments.
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