Challenger space shuttle disaster was challenger that was lost in an explosion in the year 1986 as it was taking off and led to death of seven people who were on board. The decisions that were made on that day may have been as a result of being influenced by framing on the part of NASA engineers and engineers at Morton-Thiokol (Holden, 2013).
On the fateful day the temperatures began to rise and the engineers that were responsible for building solid fuel boosters got worried. They did not want a launch with cold weather since it was danger to the astronauts. This was from earlier flights, however since these engineers did not have any positive proof that the launch was in any way dangerous, NASA decided to continue with the launch. The cameras clearly showed the astronauts shivering yet the NASA engineers still ignored the postponing of the launch as a possibility. The major cause of the accident was the cold weather that the engineers would have used to delay the launch (Roger, 1992).
The NASA engineers and Morton-Thiokol engineers failed to raise all the problems to the team that was regarded to as the launch decision team. They had developed a false sense of security resulting from other successful launches. The Morton Thiokol engineers knew about the problem of the O ring before the launch but instead of addressing the issue they focused on meeting the scheduled launch date. When they let the NASA engineers know about it, the NASA engineers said that the risk was very low. Probably if the NASA engineers gave heed to the Thiokol engineers instead they would have known the significance it carried. There was conflicting messages from the Thiokol engineers when they said it would be safe for the launching to take place (Ronald, 1987).
Holden, H. (2013). Space shuttle disaster : the tragic mission of the challenger. New York: Enslow publishers.
Roger, L. (1992). Towards the Understanding of The Space Shuttle. A Hitoriographical Essay, 39-40.
Ronald, K. (1987). The Space Shuttle Disaster: Ethical Issues in Organizational Decision Making. WesteUniversityrn Michigan , 1-39.