1.) The grooming policy implemented by the employer was not illegally discriminatory against Darlene Jespersen who worked as a bartender at Harrah’s. The dress code that has been implemented by Hannah’s did not show that it was discriminatory against the female employees since requiring them to wear make-up was not offensive. What the law provides is that employers are prohibited to discriminate their employees based on color, race, gender, religion, age and natural origin (Twomey, 2010).
However, the case of the male employees, the hair length policy which required them to have a hair length that should not go below top of shirt collars and prohibition on wearing ponytails is discriminatory especially for those employees who belong to a religion which prohibits the cutting of hair (Twomey, 2010). In the case of Jespersen, the fact that she chose not to wear makeup while she is reporting for duty means that she violated a company policy. Hence, the employer is justified not to promote her for any open positions at the casino due to her indifference to the company policy. As a general rule, the courts have allowed dress codes and grooming standards in the work place, provided that such code does not impose a great burden on one gender or the other (Twomey, 2010). Requiring the female employees to wear make-up cannot be considered as a great burden that is contemplated under the law.
2.) (1) In the case of Frank v. United Airlines, the Supreme Court held that United Airlines Inc. was guilty of sex discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Based on the facts of the case, the weight policy of United for its male and female employees was different covering the years 1980 to 1994, wherein the maximum weight for a female was correspondent to the height and weight calculations for a medium framed individuals, as opposed to the calculation of the maximum weight for the male employees was computed on the basis of a large framed individual. The court held that such act of United in using different criteria for the male and female employees on the maximum allowable weights was discriminatory (Twomey, 2010). Hence, such weight limits cannot be considered as a bona fide occupational requirement (BFOQ) since it is equivalent to disparate treatment on the basis of gender. (2) To be able to successful against the discrimination charge, the airline must provide in its defense that to have different criteria for the male and female employees on the maximum allowable weights must be proven to be reasonably necessary to the normal operations of the airline so that it will not fall as a BFOQ.
3.) Maura’s claim for sex discrimination will prosper based on the fact that she was singled out among other female workers who was stalked by one of her supervisors and received harsher discipline than men for the same conduct. At the same time, the fact that she was treated less favorably than male employees during the assignment of overtime and repeatedly became the subject of sex-based slurs which was tolerated by the supervisors will qualify as sex discrimination. The court should decide in favor of Maura 4.) The act committed against Maura need not to be sexual in nature to constitute sexual harassment. The Supreme Court held that sexual harassment includes sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal and physical conduct of sexual nature, but the conduct of co-workers must have sexual overtones (Twomey, 2010).
Twomey, R. F. (2010). Employment Law: Going Beyond Compliance to
Engagement and Empowerment. USA: McGraw Hill.