RE: Employer-employee relationship between Mel and Alice
The issue in this case is whether there was an employer-employee relationship that existed between Mel and Alice that will meet the criteria established in Amarnare.
In this given case, Alice was hired by Ex-See-Lindt Staffing to work as a temporary legal secretary at Mel’s Law Offices, but she was being paid by Ex-See-Lindt. However, Alice got her hours, assignments, and training from Mel’s and was required by Ex-See-Lindt to report to work each day in a timely manner. She was informed that she will get paid and to instructed to contact Ex-See-Lindt on a weekly basis regarding her work status. After Alice worked at Mel’s for about three weeks, she was fired by Mel after she was suspected of scheduling Mel’s client appointments during the wrong year on the computer network, and inaccuracies in her work performance. Alice filed a case based on Title VII against Mel because she is afraid that “Ex-See-Lindt” may not give her another temp assignment. Mel told her to go file the case since she was only a stupid temp, and ruined Mel’s office with her stupid work performance.
In the case law in Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Mel’s Law Office falls under the definition of an employer under the statutory definition of Title VII. There is exists an employer-employee relationship between Mel and Alice that had complied with the criteria established in the Amarnare case. Under Title VII, Mel’s is forbidden to fail or refuse to hire or discharge or discriminate any person with respect to his or her compensation, conditions, term, or privileges of employment based on the person’s race, sex, color, religion or national origin. In this particular case of Alice, it can be concluded the Mel’s Law Office and Ex-See-Lindt Staffing were her joint employers. In the case of Alice, she can invoke that Mel’s Law Office interfered with her employment opportunities with Ex-See-Lindt Staffing. Alice got her hours, assignments, and training from Mel’s even if she was paid by Ex-See-Lindt. She was also subject to the direction of Mel’s during her work assignments which establishes the element of control on the means and manner of her performance. Well-settled is the principle under the case of Amarnare that a person whose salary is paid by one entity, while his or her services are engaged on a temporary basis by another is an employee of both entities.ASSIGNMENT 2:Disciplinary Action Form
Employee Name: Timothy Alexander
Notice of Termination: September 4, 2008
Statement of the Problem: On two separate occasions, May 19, 2008 & August 20, 2008, Timothy accidentally left his weapon on the sink in the public restroom immediately outside of the stall.
Prior Discussion or warning on this subject: He received written warnings on May 19, 2008 and August 20, 2008 regarding his careless.
On August 20, 2008, he was suspended for one week without pay.
On September 4, 2008, he again left his weapon on the sink in the public bathroom and another employee, John Clarkson, saw Timothy leave the weapon on the sink and turned it in to the Judge.
Statement of Company Policy/Master Agreement on this subject: Timothy worked for Judge Harlon Braxton and based on existing policy, if any person in the public had retrieved the gun, Timothy could have been responsible for anyone’s death.
Summary of Corrective Action to be Taken: The Judge informed Timothy that there are bathrooms in the Judge’s chambers for attorneys, judges, and other staff, and it was unnecessary for him to use the public bathrooms.
Consequences of Failure to improve performance or correct behavior: Timothy advised that he was stressed and admitted his faults, but continued to forget about the other bathrooms.
Employee Comments: None
Effective September 4, 2008, after you have been placed on performance improvement, and still failed to meet expectations or make sufficient progress towards expectations, this disciplinary action may be escalated up to and including termination.
145 Conner St., Santa Fe, New Mexico, 18371
On September 4, 2008, a notice of termination was sent to you told, together with herein Disciplinary Action Form, which provides the details of your termination rendering service for Judge Braxton in Superior Court from May 14, 1978 until September 4, 2008. For failure to improve your performance and correct behavior after having been given two warnings, the court decided to terminate you based on the grounds stated in the Disciplinary Action Form. You are hereby asked to review and sign the Disciplinary Action Form within 5 days. Should you have further questions or clarifications, or disagree with any information provided in the Disciplinary Action Form, please call Stacy Braswell at 505.733.1000
(Signed) Judge Harlon Braxton
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
1801 L. Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20507
I am writing on behalf of our law firm to shed light on the case of John Tandy and explain why Mr. Tandy does not have a valid claim. The facts of Mr. Tandy’s case started when he was employed by the Queens County Sanitation Department for 25 years. Due to his vision impairment, he was not able to perform his functions well which gave him tremendous problems. As a part of his job, Mr. Tandy drives a street sweeper truck and cleans up any trash that is left on the streets of Queens County. One day, his supervisor asked why he had not been out in the street sweeper to clean the streets, and Mr. Tandy claimed that he had. When his supervisor asked him to ride with Mr. Tandy to Marietta Street in Queens County, they saw that there was trash all over the street in plain sight, and John said that he cannot recall the trash being there earlier. Such incident continued to occur for a week before Mr. Tandy went to see the doctor. His doctor told him that he was 95% blind in both eyes and unable to determine whether his vision can still be corrected through surgery because his vision impairment was severe.
Since the nature of Mr. Tandy’s work required him to drive, he needs to be constantly supervised at all times due to his vision impairment. The doctor recommended for him to be placed in an alternative job in the event that he returns to work. His employer accommodated him despite his condition by placing him on desk duty to answer incoming phone calls. However, since he could not see to take messages, the customers started hanging up after it took him awhile to transfer calls, which caused the company to lose significant amount of business. In view of the foregoing, the employer decided to terminate Mr. Tandy due to his poor performance. The complaint that Mr. Tandy filed before your office should be dismissed based on valid grounds and there that he was not discriminated against in violation of the Americans Disability Act of 1990. This was proven based on the fact that the company accommodated Mr. Tandy despite his condition and placed him on desk duty to answer incoming phone calls. However, due to his condition, he was rendered unfit for the job due to his disability, which may cause the company to lose significant amount of business. Therefore, the company has justifiable grounds to terminate Mr. Tandy due to his disability.
Very Truly Yours,
RE: Allegations of Age Discrimination Showing Disparate TreatmentDATE: March 16, 2014
The issue in this case is to determine whether Sabrina Houston had been discriminated for her age which showed disparate treatment.
Based from the facts of the case, Houston, 55 years old, worked as the Chief Elections Advisor in her county for the last 5 years. She worked her way to the top after she started out as a receptionist after high school. The position of the Chief Elections Advisor position required a college degree and completion of a six-month training course. Houston overlooked this requirement. After the Regional Elections Advisor was fired for failure to supervise the Elections Advisors on the county level properly, all of the Chief Elections in several counties in the state were fired, and asked to reapply for their positions. Houston was told that she was not qualified for the position after she reapplied for her job. Another employee was hired to take over the position of Houston. The new employee, Roberta McIntosh, who was sixty-year-old had a bachelor’s degree in political science, and completed two training courses in “Local Elections and Politics.”
Kiesling (1997) stated that disparate treatment refers to the unlawful practice of treating an employee differently based on his or her membership in a protected class. In this particular case, the case filed by Ms. Houston against her employer based on the age discrimination will not prosper. In fact, McIntosh, the new employee who took over the position of Houston was 60 years old, and older than Houston, who is only 55 years old. The reason was Houston was not re-hired was due to the fact that she was not qualified for the position since she did not hold a college degree and completion of a six-month training course. The employer’s decision to hire Roberta McIntosh was based on her credentials of having a bachelor’s degree in political science, and completed two training courses in “Local Elections and Politics.” Hence, there was no age discrimination committed by the employer since McIntosh is even older than Houston. Hence, there is no prima facie case for age discrimination to show disparate treatment.ASSIGNMENT 5:
RE: Allegations of Racial and Religious Discrimination
The issue in this case is to determine whether Fabiola Touissaint can file a case for race and religious discrimination.
Based from the facts of the case, Fabiola Touissaint was qualified to apply for the RN position at a local hospital after graduating with honors from Yale Medical School. She also possesses the 5 years experience to be qualified for the position as her former employer vouched for her work ethics and capabilities. Despite her excellent interview by the personnel department, she was advised that her dreadlock hairstyle was “too black” and is likely to cause hazard due to the length of her locks. Fabiola explained that her locks are a part of her Rastafarian religion that she had been practicing as a child. Instead the hospital assumed that she was a part of a cult and told her that they cannot condone her decision maintain such hair style. The hospital hired another applicant named John Whitton, a white male, who does not have enough experience in after having just passed the nursing exam within the last six months.
The local hospital should be liable to pay damages to Fabiola for violating Title VII on the prohibition against race and religious discrimination inside the workplace. In the recent case of Taco Bell, the company settled the religious discrimination lawsuit with the EEOC by paying $27,000 to Christopher Abbey (Hyman, 2012). In this given case, Abbey was practicing the religion Nazirite, which prohibits him to have a haircut from the time he reached the age of 15. The company informed Abbey that the company will be forced to terminate him if he will not cut his hair. Abbey filed a case before the EEOC on the ground of religious discrimination. The act of Taco Bell by entering a settlement agreement with Abbey is an indication that there was a failure on the part of the company to accommodate the religion of Abbey when it required him to cut his hair.
Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 611 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y 1984).
Bernardin, J. H. and Russel, J.E. (2012). Human resource management: An experiential
approach, 6th ed. Boston: Mc Graw/Hill.
Hyman, J. (2012). $27,000 buys a lot of chalupas: Taco Bell settles religious discrimination
lawsuit with EEOC. Ohio’s Employer’s Law Blog. Web. Retrieved on March 17, 2014,
Kiesling, D.F. (1997). Title VII and the Temporary Employment Relationship. Valparaiso