One way of preventing FMA attacks includes increasing the key length to 48 bits, which allows the IV to double up and combine with the secret key making the secret key more complicated (Singh, Singh, and Joseph, 2008). Incorporating a temporary key integrity protocol (TKIP) in a WEP helps to avoid weak keys and further obscures the secret key. This is possible since the TKIP changes the secret key with each packet (Beck, 2008).
The decision to use layered defense mechanism to prevent WPA attacks is accurate. Using a layered network such as the authenticated network architecture (ANA) allows limited different roles and access to be identified that reduces the number of access to the network (Convery, 2008). Additionally, to prevent attacks the WPA utilizes a temporary key integrity protocol (TKIP), which has an advanced key mixing functionality that has the capacity to provide a different key for each packet. Additionally, presence of a 64-bit message integrity check (MIC) prevents attacks on weak CRC32 integrity protection mechanism used in WEP (Beck, 2008).
In the BlueSmack attack, the L2CAP echo request is approximately 600 bytes and is normally directed to a Bluetooth device with limited hardware resources (Becker, 2007). Some of the methods of limiting device discoverability and connectivity include disabling device when, not in use, user awareness(ignoring possible phishing links) and changing device names (Chou, 2012).
Becker, A. (2007). Bluetooth Security & Hacks. Retrieved form
Beck, M. (2008). Practical Attacks against WEP and WPA. Retrieved from
Chou, T. (2012). Information assurance and security technologies for risk assessment and threat
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Convery, S. (2008). Authenticated Network Architecture.
Retrieved from: http://seanconvery.com/ANAPaper.pdf
Singh, A., Singh, B., & Joseph, H. (2008). Vulnerability analysis and defense for the Internet.
Retrieved from Scribd website: http://www.scribd.com